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Extreme Circumstances Call for Extreme
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Remedies Corrected a Grave Injustice
United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D.

Fla. 2004)
United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D.

Fla. 2010)
by Samuel W. Wardle
ver the course of a decade, Antonino "Nino" Lyons
appeared before the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida at least four times. In 2001, a
jury convicted Lyons of crimes carrying a mandatory minimum
sentence oflife in federal prison. In 2003, the Honorable Gregory
PresnelP ordered Lyons to be released on bail, only to be reversed
by the Eleventh Circuit. A year later, in 2004,Judge Presnell again
ordered Lyons' release, and this time, there was no appeal. 2 Finally,
in 2010, Judge Presnell took the extraordinary step of granting
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The views and opinions expressed in this Comment are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of the United States District
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Samuel W. Wardle received the JD, 2013, University of Miami School of Law. The
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President Clinton appointed Judge Presnell to the Middle District in 2000.
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United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2004) [hereinafter

Lyons I].
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Lyons' pet1t10n for a certification of actual innocence. 3 This
certification cleared the path for Lyons' successful suit against the
United States Government for wrongful conviction. 4
Judge Presnell's decision to reverse Lyons' conviction and
set him free constituted an extraordinary application of Brady
v. Maryland, 5 which requires prosecutors to share exculpatory
evidence with a criminal defendant. United States v. Lyons is one
of the very few reported federal cases in which a conviction was
entirely reversed, and a defendant freed from jail, simply on the
basis of withheld impeachment evidence relating to jailhouse
informants.
But the extraordinary nature of Lyons' case did not end
with Judge Presnell's application of the Brady doctrine. Judge
Presnell's decision to declare Lyons innocent of all charges against
him was also nearly unprecedented. Federal courts rarely grant
certifications of innocence at all, much less in cases like Lyons,
where the defendant was exonerated by evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct, rather than hard exculpatory evidence.
This Comment examines why such extraordinary measures
were necessary to redress the unjust prosecution and imprisonment
of Nino Lyons. First, the Comment examines the evidence withheld
by prosecutors from Lyons' defense attorneys. At trial, Lyons'
prosecutors put dozens of convicted felons on the stand to testify
against him. Each witness lied about Lyons' supposed criminal
activity, and prosecutors concealed these witnesses' mendacity-or
at least their inducements to lie-from Lyons.
Second, the Comment describes why Judge Presnell
appropriately granted Lyons' petition for a certification of actual
innocence under the federal Unjust Conviction Statute. Such
petitions are granted only in extreme cases, in which an exoneree
can carry the burden of proving his own innocence. United States v.
Lyons was such a case.
Finally, the Comment proposes that the approach taken
by Judge Presnell in Lyons' long fight to prove his innocence
should be the rule, rather than the well-reasoned exception. The
United States Constitution, as currently interpreted, provides little

3
4
5

United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2010) [hereinafter
Lyons Il].
Lyons v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 552 (2011) [hereinafter Lyons III] .
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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protection for criminal defendants who, like Nino Lyons, have
been convicted on the basis of testimony from jailhouse informants.
Moreover, the Urtjust Conviction Statute raises a bar so high that
few victims of Brady violations are ever able to take advantage of its
remedies. In tandem, these factors prejudice both defendants and
prosecutors.
2001: Nino Lyons' Arrest and Prosecution

On June 14, 1998, two men robbed Nino Lyons in a hotel near
Orlando. The men had lured Lyons to the hotel by claiming to
represent a musical group interested in playing at Lyons' nightclub. 6
Instead, one of the men pulled a gun and demanded the cash that
Lyons had brought with him to hire the musical group. 7
After the thieves left the hotel, Lyons went after them. He
saw a man in a car at the hotel's entrance who he thought was the
robbers' getaway driver. Lyons ordered the man out of the car, and
commanded the hotel staff to hold him until police arrived. Lyons
thenjumped into the still-running car, and drove off after the men
who had tricked him. 8
Largely due to Lyons' quick response, one of the thieves was
captured. The man whose car Lyons commandeered turned out to
be an innocent bystander with no connection to the robbery, but
he refused to press charges. Lyons was given a community service
award for his role in apprehending the robbers. 9
Unfortunately, that was not Lyons' final experience with the
criminal justice system. Officers began to quietly investigate Lyons,
and, in 2001, the United States Attorney for the Middle District
of Florida indicted him for carjacking, counterfeiting, and largescale drug-dealing. 10
At the time of his indictment, Lyons was a businessman with a
spotless local reputation. Lyons, a former high school and college
basketball star, lived with his wife and children in a $60,000 home. 11
6

7
8
9

10
11

Defendant's Reply to Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Certification of Actual Innocence Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513 at 3-4,
United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2010) (No.
6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 355 [hereinafter Def.'s Reply].
Telephone Interview with Antonino Lyons (March 27, 2012).
Def's Reply, supra note 7, at 3-4.
Id.
Lyons I at 1237-38.
Def. 's Reply, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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Lyons owned several businesses, and his wife was an elementary
school principal. Lyons had no criminal convictions 12 and was a
community leader who volunteered with the NAACP and other
civic organizations. 13
Prosecutors nevertheless found dozens of witnesses willing
to testify that Lyons' record was not as clean as it looked. For
example, the men who robbed Lyons claimed that they lured him
to the hotel with a promise to sell him $100,000 of cocaine, and
that Lyons' lied when he said he had gone to the hotel to hire
a musical group. 14 These men, and more than two dozen others,
wove a staggering tale of Lyons as a violent man at the center of
million-dollar cocaine enterprise. 15
As is standard procedure in drug investigations, these felons
were offered sentence reductions and other benefits in exchange
for their testimony. 16 The Government had no hard evidence of
drugs, no wiretap recordings, and no surveillance evidence of
Lyons engaging in any illegal activity. 17 Yet the sheer number of
witnesses against Lyons overwhelmed his defense. Lyons was
arrested in August 2001, and his case went before a jury in late
November 2001. 18
In closing arguments, Lyons' prosecutor argued that the jury
should consider the thirty witnesses against Lyons "one at a time,
consider them as a group, because you've got to consider all the
evidence. You've got to just take it all out, because if you believe
one of them, just one, that means Antonino Lyons is lying and he's
a drug dealer." 19 Lyons was convicted.

2001-2004: Withheld evidence comes to light
Almost immediately after Lyons' conviction, evidence began
to creep out that something had gone wrong at trial. While Lyons
awaited sentencing, one of his attorneys, Robert Berry, was reviewing

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Telephone interview with Antonino Lyons, supra note 8.
Id.
Lyons lat 1239-40.
United States v. Lyons, No. 02-13452, 57 F. App 'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir. Dec.
30, 2002).
Lyons lat 1236.
Id.
Lyons III at 554.
Lyons lat 1240-41.
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Lyons' forty-page pre-sentence investigation report. 20 Berry found
one sentence attributed to prosecution witness David Mercer that
contradicted Mercer's testimony at Lyons' trial. 21 Berry and his
partner, Greg Eisenmenger, filed a flurry of motions, including a
motion for a new trial and a motion to compel the production of
any documentation on Mercer. 22
In May 2002, Judge Presnell vacated Lyons' sentence and
ordered that Lyons be released on bail pending a new trial. 23
Judge Presnell reasoned that the Mercer evidence may have led
a jury to doubt the veracity of all Government witnesses, and that
the Government prejudiced Lyons' trial by withholding it. 24 The
Government immediately appealed. 25
A twojudge quorum of the Eleventh Circuit reversed Judge
Presnell's orders and affirmed Lyons' conviction in an unpublished,
16-page opinion. 26 The quorum agreed that the Mercer evidence
withheld by the Government was Brady material. 27 However, the
quorum went on to find that the Mercer evidence, without more,
was not important enough to justify a new trial. Specifically, the
quorum reasoned that it was
simply not possible to review this record and come to
any other conclusion than that arrived at by the jury....
Mercer's testimony was only one piece of a rather large
picture. We conclude that there exists no reasonable
probability that disclosure of the Mercer tapes, transcripts,
notes and reports would have affected the outcome of the
jury's verdict ..... 28

20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Telephone Interview with Robert Berry and Greg Eisenmenger criminal
defense attorneys for Antonino Lyons (March 23, 2012) [hereinafter Berry/
Eisenmenger Interview].
Id.
Id.
Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
Order Granting Motion for a New Trial, United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d
1231 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2002) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 208.
Notice of Appeal, United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M. D. Fla.June
19, 2002) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 231.
United States v. Lyons, o. 02-13452, 57 F. App 'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir. Dec.
30, 2002).
Id. at 9 ("We find that the district court was correct in finding that the Mercer
tapes, transcripts, notes and reports were Brady material. ").
Id. at 10-11.
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After the Eleventh Circuit's reversal,Judge Presnell ordered an
in camera review of all evidence that the Government did not give
Lyons and his attorneys. 29 This order began the great unraveling
of the Government's case against Lyons. Over the course of a year,
Magistrate Judge David Baker learned that the Mercer evidence was
just the tip of the iceberg. Magistrate Judge Baker found that the
Government had withheld a staggering amount of evidence that
Lyons' attorneys could have used to attack the credibility of nearly
all Government witnesses. 30 Because the Government's case against
Lyons was built entirely on these witnesses' sworn testimony, the
evidence impeaching them was critical to Lyons' defense. And he
had been convicted without the benefit of ever knowing it existed.
Magistrate Judge Baker's report lists, in minute detail, scores
of pieces of crucial evidence that the Government failed to disclose
to Lyons or his attorneys. For example, the Government withheld
evidence that contradicted the testimony of jailed informants
who claimed to have been two of Lyons' biggest customers. 31 The
Government likewise withheld evidence that Frantz Jean Mary,
a man who claimed to be Lyons' highest-volume supplier, had
been promised assistance with his pending deportation to Haiti in
exchange for his testimony. 32
One witness, Antonio Holley, claimed at trial that he had
purchased at least ten kilograms of cocaine from Lyons, and that
Lyons had twice offered to pay Holley to kill rivals. 33 Holley also
testified that he had identified Lyons as a drug supplier during a
previous trial. 34 The Government did not disclose that Holley had
never previously mentioned Lyons in any context, or that Holley
had once perjured himself on the stand. 35
Jeanty Jacques, the man who helped orchestrate Lyons'
1998 robbery, accused Lyons of cocaine trafficking and testified
29

30

31
32
33
34
35

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Investigative Notes and Reports,
United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2003) (No.
6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 272.
Lyons I at 1249. See generally In Camera Ex Parte Report and Recommendation
at 14-15, United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2004)
Case No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAH, ECF No. 300 [hereinafter Ex Parle Report]
(describing in detail the Brady material withheld on nearly all prosecution
witnesses) .
Lyons latl24l.
ExParteReport, supra note 35, at 14-15.
Lyons I at 1242.
Id.
Id.
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that "I ain't looking for no sentence reduction" in exchange for
incriminating testimony. 36 The Government failed to correct
Jacques, even though it had already filed a sealed motion for a
sentence reduction on Jacques' behalf. 37 In fact, at 6:07 p.m. on the
very day thatJacques testified, Lyons' prosecutor emailedJacques'
prosecutor, an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern
District of Florida, recommending a 50 % reduction of Jacques'
sentence in a separate case. 38
The extraordinary dismissal of the case against Nino Lyons
In January 2004, another Assistant United States Attorney
replaced Lyons' lead prosecutor. 39 Then, in May-several months
after the release of Magistrate Judge Baker's report-the new
prosecutor filed a motion dismissing the Government's drug
conspiracy charges, leaving Lyons accused only of carjacking and
counterfeiting. 40 Judge Presnell ultimately concluded that this step
in the right direction did not go far enough and reversed Lyons'
entire conviction, noting" [prosecutorial] misconduct so pervaded
the case that dismissal of the remaining counts is warranted." 41
Specifically, Judge Presnell held that the previous prosecutor's
decision to withhold a mass of impeachment evidence caused such
"unconscionable delay and prejudice to Lyons as well as to the
judicial process" as to warrant a total dismissal. 42
Under Brady v. Maryland, 43 prosecutors violate a defendant's
Due Process rights by withholding "material" exculpatoryevidence. 44
And under Giglio v. United States, 45 this duty includes evidence that
36
37
38
39
40

41
42

43
44
45

Id. at 1242-43.
Id.
Id.
Notice of Attorney Appearance, United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231
(M.D. Fla.Jan. 26, 2004) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 286.
Motion by United States to Vacate Jury Verdict, United States v. Lyons, 352 F.
Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2004) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No.
304.
Lyons lat 1234-35.
Id. at 1251. Dismissal of a case for Brady violations is a rare sanction, reserved
only for the most extreme cases. In fact, many states have express provisions
prohibiting judges from reversing convictions solely based on Brady violations.
See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the
Inferenceoflnnocence, 100]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 444-46 (2010).
373 U .S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 86.
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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could be used to impeach prosecution witnesses. 46 Brady's guarantee
is expansive, but its interaction with Giglio is often unclear.
Impeachment evidence, particularly evidence that impeaches
witnesses whom the defendant already knows are convicted felons,
is often not considered "material" under Brady. Therefore, proof
that a prosecutor withheld impeachment evidence regarding a
convicted felon will rarely justify a new trial, much less an order
dismissing an entire indictment or one reversing a guilty verdict.
"Impeachment evidence" is a broad term, encompassing
anything that could cause a jury to doubt the reliability of a witness's
testimony. 47 In its own right, the admissibility and relevance of a
piece of impeachment evidence is often difficult to determine. 48
And it becomes a great deal more complicated when subjected to
the Brady materiality standard.
Put simply, the materiality of impeachment evidence is much
harder to determine than that of classic exculpatory evidence. 49
The Brady materiality standard, as applied to a typical piece of
exculpatory evidence (such as a parallel confession, contradictory
video footage, or DNA evidence) is fairly straightforward-if the
evidence is exculpatory enough to sway the outcome at trial, it
must be disclosed.
Yet the materiality of impeachment evidence can be a
much closer question. 50 A legal tension exists between the Brady
materiality standard and Giglio's directive that prosecution/ witness
deals must be disclosed to the defense. When prosecutors withhold
impeachment evidence and a defendant is subsequently convicted,
an appellate panel will vacate the verdict only if the prosecution
suppressed evidence "material to the case." 5 1 Impeachment
evidence is material only if "there is a reasonable probability that,
had the [impeachment] evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." 52

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 154-55.
Id.
See generally FED. R. Evrn . 601-609 (describing the complex parameters for the
admissibility of impeachment evidence).
See e.g. R. Michael Cassidy, P/,ea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractab/,e Prob/,em
of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1439-40 ( 2011) .
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985).
United States v. Lewis, 567 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
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A number of factors weigh against the materiality of
impeachment evidence that prosecutors possess regarding
convicted felon witnesses. For one, a defendant will usually be aware
if a witness offered against him is a convicted felon or is currently
incarcerated. A prior conviction is a classic ground upon which
to impeach a witness. 53 The witnesses against Lyons, for example,
were thoroughly impeached on the basis of their past criminal
convictions. 54 Yet a prosecutor's use of convicted felons as witnesses
has the ironic effect of making impeachment evidence beyond
their criminal histories less material, as the law is clear that "[e]
vidence that impeaches an already thoroughly impeached witness
is the definition of 'cumulative impeachment' evidence and its
suppression cannot give rise to a Brady violation." 55
Moreover, the materiality of evidence impeaching an individual
felon witness is lessened where the witness's testimony is corroborated
by others. 56 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit, in affirming Lyons'
conviction after his attorneys learned of the first piece of withheld
evidence, found the number of witnesses who testified against
Lyons to be dispositive. "In this case," the Eleventh Circuit noted,
"Mercer was not a key witness whose testimony was essential ....
Twenty-nine additional witnesses provided testimony regarding
Lyons' extensive drug dealings." 57
The materiality of impeachment evidence also diminishes
where the witness's testimony is not central to the case against the
defendant; 58 where the witness testifies regarding only one count of

53
54
55

56

57
58

See FED. R. Evrn. 609 (establishing standard for impeachment by prior
conviction).
Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 819 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Barker v.
Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that impeachment
evidence of witness' four prior convictions was duplicative and immaterial
because witness was impeached on the basis of other criminal misconduct).
Mascioli v. United States, o. 1:07CV44, 2009 WL 1328105 at *5 (N.D. W.
Va. May 12, 2009) (holding that evidence of an undisclosed deal between a
witness and the government was not material, because two other government
witnesses gave largely the same testimony).
United States v. Lyons, No. 02-13452at15, 57 F. App'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2002).
United States v. Gonzalez, 938 F. Supp. 1199, 1213 (D. Del. 1996) ("[W]here
the witness does not directly incriminate the defendant . . . the undisclosed
information about that witness is deemed to be immaterial.").
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a multi-count indictment; 59 where the exact terms of an informal
deal between a witness and the prosecution were withheld from
-the defense; 60 or where other independent evidence supports the
defendant's guilt. 61 In its most recent decision construing Brady,
the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the judicial practice
of balancing materiality against other factors. In Wetzel v. Lambert,
the Court held that potentially exculpatory evidence was likely
immaterial, because the evidence was ambiguous. 62
In Lyons, the sheer scale of the withheld impeachment
evidence overwhelmed the factors, outlined above, that weigh
against the materiality of impeachment evidence against convicted
felon witnesses. The Government did not just withhold evidence
impeaching a handful of the thirty witnesses it proffered against
Lyons-it withheld evidence that could have impeached every
single one of them. And the evidence touched the very heart of
the case against Lyons. Indeed, the Government essentially had no
case at all once Magistrate Judge Baker's review was complete. 63
Judge Presnell's order to dismiss Lyons' conviction puts
United States v. Lyons on a very short list of cases in which an
entire indictment was dismissed, and a defendant set free, due to
pervasive Brady violations. The typical remedy for Brady violations
is a new trial, not dismissal. 64 As the Northern District of New Jersey
noted in a habeas corpus case nearly thirty years ago, "[i] mmediate
release from custody with prejudice is rarely awarded .... "65
In fact, only one federal appellate panel has ever affirmed a
complete dismissal solely on the basis of Brady violations related to

59

60
61
62
63

64
65

United States v. Weintraub, 871F.2d1257, 1262 (5th Cir. 1989) (" [T]he veracity
ofEmrick's trial testimony regarding the details ofjust one cocaine transaction
on December 31, 1982 was not essential to establishing Weintraub's guilt on
States
the conspiracy charges .... ").
United
v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251 , 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1993).
Stephens v. Costello, 55 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (W.D.N.Y 1999).
132 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012).
See e.g. Lyons I at 1249-51 (describing the extent of the withheld evidence,
and noting that once the evidence was turned over to Lyons, the Government
moved to dismiss the drug conspiracy charge, and offered to release Lyons on
time served for the remaining charges).
See e.g. Ramsey v. Belleque, No. CIV 03-193-BR, 2005 WL 1502875 (D. Or.
2005).
Carterv. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 559 (D.NJ. 1985) aff'd in pertinent part, 826
F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. LJ. 1509, 1509 (2009)
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impeachment evidence of felon witnesses. 66 In 2008, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed United States v. Chapman, 67 a
· case with facts remarkably similar to those in Lyons. In Chapman, an
Assistant United States Attorney knowingly withheld "650 pages ...
of rap sheets, plea agreements, cooperation agreements, and other
information related to numerous government witnesses .... "68 The
defense was not made aware of these materials until the third week
of trial, after twenty-five prosecution witnesses had already taken
the stand. 69 In a decision remarkably similar to Lyons, the Ninth
Circuit found that the prosecution's "flagrant" and "outrageous"
misconduct justified a complete dismissal of all charges. 70
The rarity of dismissals based on large-scale Brady violations
raises a difficult point. Evidence of the Government's Brady
violations in Lyons' trial trickled in over the course of more than
a year. When the first such piece of evidence-the undisclosed
information on David Mercer-came to light, the Eleventh Circuit
applied the materiality standard and found that a single piece of
impeachment evidence was immaterial, and did not justify a new
trial or release. 71 In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit correctly
applied the prevailing standard-courts evaluating Brady claims
examine the effect of the totality of evidence presented at trial, not
just an individual piece. 72 Therefore, if Magistrate Judge Baker had
only uncovered evidence of a few Brady violations, Lyons probably
would not have been released or granted a new trial.
The extraordinary certification of Lyons' innocence

Several years after Lyons' release, Berry suggested to
Eisenmenger, that they attempt to certify Lyons' innocence
and pursue a wrongful conviction claim against the federal
government. 73 The federal Unjust Conviction Statute gives a

66

67
68
69
70
71
72
73

United States v. Lashley, No. CRIM.A. 09-307, 2011 WL 5237291 (E.D. Pa.
2011) ("The Court is aware of only one case in which a federal appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of an indictment for a Brady violation.").
524 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id. at 1084-87.
United States v. Lyons, No. 02-13452 at 15, 57 F. App'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2002).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995).
Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
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wrongfully convicted individual a statutory cause of action against
the government, and authorizes the Court of Claims to award the
-individual $50,000 per year of imprisonment. 74 Yet, the Statute also
requires, as a prerequisite to money damages, that a district court
certify the exoneree's complete innocence of all charges and lack
of any other fault leading to his conviction. 75
The requirements for a certification of innocence are difficult,
and in most cases impossible, to satisfy, absent hard physical
evidence or a valid confession from another person. 76 These
requirements have little to do with the perceived fairness of the
exoneree's conviction. Rather, an individual seeking a certification
of his innocence has the burden of proof in showing: ( 1) that he
did not commit the charged crime, and (2) that he did nothing
through his own negligence to bring about his prosecution and
conviction. 77
The Unjust Conviction Statute is not intended to indemnify
every exonerated former prisoner. 78 It is an extraordinary remedy
for exceptional cases. 79 Little case law exists that applies the statute,
probably because, as one court noted, "few applicants can satisfy
its rigorous standard." 80 The Supreme Court has never elaborated
on the statute, and only a handful of federal appellate courts have
ever reached it. 81 Of those few decisions, all but one 82 affirmed a
district court's denial of an exoneree's petition for certification of
actual innocence. 83

74
75
76
77
78

79
80
81

82
83

28 U.S.C. § 2513. Up to $100,000 per year is available to individuals wrongfully
convicted of a capital crime.
Lyons !lat 1364.
Mary C. Delaney et al., Exonerees' Hardships After Freedom, 83 Wis. LAW. 18, 21
(Feb. 2010).
Id.
Lyons II at 1365; see also United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 639-40

(S.D.N.Y 1947) (finding that, although the evidence did not prove the
defendant's guilt, it was nevertheless sufficient to raise a question as to his
innocence, thereby foreclosing the possibility of a certification of innocence).
Lyons II at 1365.
United States v. Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (S.D . W.Va.
2008).
United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 182 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Racing Servs., Inc. , 580 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2009); Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d
1278, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 841 (5th
Cir. 1963); Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 73 (D .C. Cir. 1953).
Betts, 10 F.3d at 1285-86
See Amy Oxley, Not Innocent Enough: The Denial of a Certificate of Innocence based
on Neg/,ect in United Stales v. Graham, 36 S. ILL. U.LJ. 425, 427 (2012).
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Eisenmenger was initially skeptical of Berry's suggestion, with
good reason. 84 Like dismissals under Brady, innocence petitions
are granted only in the face of the most "flagrant" prosecutorial
misconduct and subsequent injustice. 85
The situations in which a certification of innocence may be
granted are carefully circumscribed. A claimant whose conviction
was reversed on procedural grounds 86 or insufficiency of evidence, 87
or any other ground unrelated to the defendant's innocence, 88
does not generally have a basis to petition for innocence. Rather,
the defendant must show that he did not commit a crime. In Betts
v. United States, for example, Betts was convicted of violating a court
order. 89 Betts certified his innocence by showing that the court
order was too vague to be enforced. 90
Certifications of innocence in drug cases are exceedingly rare.
United States v. Lyons may be the only district court case to ever grant
such a petition in regard to drug conspiracy charges. Only one
other district court has granted a recent petition for innocence in
a drug case. In Jones v. United States, the Eastern District of Missouri
certified the innocence of a defendant who had been sentenced
to 20 years in prison for drug-related charges. The defendant had
been convicted solely on the basis of testimony from a police officer
who was later imprisoned for corrupt practices. 91 The government
in Jones conceded the defendant's innocence because, without the
officer's testimony, it had no case. 92 Like the Lyons prosecution,
the Jones prosecution had no physical evidence of the defendant's
possession of drugs. 93
The Government began its brief in opposition to Lyons'
motion for certification of innocence by admitting that the
"prosecution of Lyons did not reflect the government at its best." 94
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
Osborn, 322 F.2d at 841.
United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284.
Id. (noting that the facts underlying the B etts case are "gothic," and provide a
very interesting read). See Matter of Betts, 927 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1991).
Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284.
No. 4:10-CV-1748 CEJ, 2011WL2516600 (E.D. Mo.June 23, 2011).
Id. at *l.
Id. at *2.
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Certification of Actual Innocence
Under 28 U.S.C.A. 2513 at 1, United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB)ECF No. 353.
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The Government also conceded that Lyons was innocent of dealing
drugs. 95 The Government did not argue, as prosecutors have in
·other cases, that Lyons somehow brought about his prosecution by
his own negligence or misconduct. 96 The ruling, then, boiled down
to whether Lyons was innocent of carjacking and counterfeiting.
Lyons proved his innocence by showing that he had no
criminal intent in the underlying acts for which he was charged.
When he commandeered a man's car outside the hotel in 1998,
Lyons' intent was to stop a crime, not harm the driver or steal a
car. 97 And Lyons proved that he did not know that a few items of
second-hand clothing in his shop were counterfeit. 98
A year later, the Court of Federal Claims awarded Lyons the full
statutory amount, giving him $140,000 for his nearly three years in
prison. 99 In March 2012, the Government dropped its final appeal,
clearing the way for the United States Department of Treasury to
pay Lyons. 100
Brady: A right without a remedy

In recent years, a growing coalition of judges, academics,
and attorneys has begun to advocate for a change to the Brady
materiality standard. 101 The criticism focuses on the challenges
prosecutors face in actually applying the standard. The Brady
materiality inquiry requires that prosecutors engaged in the "oftencompetitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" 102 put aside their
adversarial bias and hand the weakest elements of their case over
to the defense. At the same time, it presents prosecutors with the
dilemma of guessing not only whether that evidence could sway

95
96

Id. at 2 n.l.
See e.g. Eastridge v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 66, 69 (D.D.C. 2009)
(rejecting government's argument that exonerees brought about their own
prosecution).
97 Lyons flat 1366-67.
98 Id. at 1368. Lyons purchased clothing for his store from wholesale and discount
suppliers. The counterfeits he inadvertently purchased were so authenticlooking that only an expert could distinguish them from the real name brand.
See Def.'s Reply, supra note 7, at 4 iI 10.
99 Lyons III at 553.
100 E-mail from Robert Berry, Lyons' attorney, to autl10r (Mar. 28, 2012) (on file
with author).
101 See e.g. Cassidy, supra note 54, at 1439-40.
102 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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the outcome at trial, but whether a future appellate panel might
believe that it would have done so. 103
This exercise in crystal-ball gazing is primed for error. Courts
interpret Giglio to hold that impeachment evidence must be
disclosed if the impeachable witness' credibility will determine
guilt or innocence. 104 Yet, it is often impossible to know, before
trial, which witness will prove most important to the jury, what parts
of the witness' testimony will be most important, and whether a
given piece of impeachment evidence will significantly affect that
witness' credibility in the jury's eyes.
The use of testimony from jailhouse informants, like those
who testified against Lyons, only compounds the difficulty.
'Jailhouse snitches" are nearly indispensable in drug conspiracy
cases like Lyons, where the government's only evidence is often
circumstantial. 105 Yet they tend to testify in exchange for favors, such
as sentence reductions. The powerful inducement to lie created by
these favors has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly and
judicial commentary and debate. 106
More than fifty percent of federal judges and ninety percent of
defense attorneys favor some form of clarifying and strengthening
of the government's obligations under Brady. 107 This coalition has
sought to change the Brady standard by appealing to the Department
ofJustice (DOJ) and the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. 108 These efforts
have thus far yielded little real improvement. The DOJ has released
a number of directives recommending that federal prosecutors
interpret Brady liberally. 109 The ABA has proposed a broad
interpretation of Model Rule 3.S(d) that requires expansive pre-trial
103 See e. g. Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch ofFlaws, 67 WASH. & L EE L. REv. 1533,
1542 (2010).
104 Cvijanovich v. United States, 3:07-CR-55, 2011WL2680485 at *9 (D.N.D. 2011)
("If a witness's reliability may dete rmine guilt or innocence, the impeachment
information falls within the Brady rule. ").
105 Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of
Offering Testimony by jailhouse Informants an d Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1413 (Dec. 2007).
106 See generally id.
107 Mike Scarcella, Divided on Discovery, NAT'L LJ., Mar 14, 2011.
108 Cassidy, supra note 54 at 1445.
109 Id.; see also Memorandum from David W. Ogden , Deputy Att'y General,
to Dep 't Prosecutors Qan. 4, 2010) (regarding "Guidance for Prosecutors
Regarding Criminal Discovery"), avail,abl,e at http:/ / wwwJustice.gov/ dag/
discovery-guidance. pdf.
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disclosures by prosecutors. 110 But the ABA rule is toothless and rarely
enforced, 111 and the DOJ's directives have had no apparent effect. 112
-These are poor substitutes for a constitutional right. 113
The debate over the materiality standard tends to invoke a
great deal of criticism of prosecutors. Civil libertarians critique the
standard as a tool that unscrupulous prosecutors use to subvert the
civil liberties of criminal defendants. 114 This is beside the point,
and probably wrong. The problem is not that prosecutors are
dishonest-the vast majority of prosecutors are dedicated public
servants with high ethical standards. The problem is that the
materiality standard is primed for error. 11 5
The second flaw in Brady is its lack of a vigorous enforcement
mechanism. Lyons' $140,000 award may seem paltry compared to
the time he lost and the massive damage to his reputation. In fact,
considering the law of reparations for the wrongfully imprisoned,
he was lucky to receive anything at all. 116
Despite Brady's promise of expansive protections for the
criminally accused, few jurisdictions within the United States
actually have vigorous mechanisms by which to enforce Brady. 117
When prosecutors withhold exculpatory or impeachment
evidence and then obtain a conviction, the usual remedy is a new
trial, where the defendant will receive the benefit of the previously
withheld evidence. Yet in extraordinary cases like Lyons, where an
entire prosecution is unraveled by newly discovered Brady material,
the law gives wrongfully convicted defendants few opportunities
to be compensated for the devastation to their lives, finances,
and reputations.

110 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009).
111 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REv. 381, 398 (2002).
112 Cassidy, supra note 54 at 1447.
113 See Cassidy, supra note 54 at 1445-60.
114 See, e.g., Angela]. Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMER1CAN
PROSECUTOR 130-31 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
115 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2119,
2135 (2010).
116 Only a few years before Lyons' certification of innocence, Congress upped the
annual compensation amount under the Unjust Conviction Act from $5,000
to $50,000. Lyons III at 555 ..
11 7 See generally Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52
DRAKE L. REv. 703 (Summer, 2004).
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A growing chorus of legal academics, lawyers, and judges is
calling for an enhanced remedy for the victims of Brady violations. 11 8
The current regime simply does not provide sufficient incentives
for prosecutors to make the right choice, nor does it give much
recourse for defendants who were harmed by withheld evidence. 11 9
These commentators argue that the traditional remedy for a Brady
violation-a new trial-is inadequate to compensate exonerees. 120
Postscript

Nearly three years after his August 2001 imprisonment, Nino
Lyons was finally released from jail. 121 "I'm happy to be home,"
Lyons told reporters, outside the jail. "But am I satisfied? No.
Because I spent thirty-four months of my life in jail, for no reason
at all." 122
Since 1989, well over 200 people have been exonerated by the
hard science of DNA testing; hundreds more by other evidence. 123
Most of them, like Lyons, lost everything attempting to prove their
innocence. 124 Those lucky enough to be set free find it exceedingly
difficult to readjust to society, given the stigma of any conviction,
even one obtained unfairly. 125
Nino Lyons lost nearly everything while he was in jail, including
his businesses, his home, and his retirement savings. 126 Even
eight years after his release, Lyons says that it would "not even be
possible, not by a long shot" to get his life back to what it was before
his arrest. 127 He now works for a company that provides tutoring
materials to elementary schools, but has been unable to find
employment commensurate with his education and experience. 128

118 See, e.g., Sunil Bhave, The Innocent Have Rights, Too: Expanding Brady v. Maryland
to provide the Criminally Innocent with a Cause of Action Against Police Officers Who
Withhold Exculpatory Evidence, 45 CREIGH TO L. REv. 1 (2011).
119 See Raeder, supra note 110at1439-40.
120 Bhave, supra note 123, at 3.
121 Lyons II at 1364.
122 Brad Heath and Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors' Conduct Can Tip Justice Scales, USA
TODAY at Al (Sept. 23, 2010) (Video available online at http:/ / www.usatoday.
com/ video/ index.htm?bctid=615464508001) ..
123 Delaney, supra note 81, at 21.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Telephone Interview with ino Lyons, supra note 8.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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His wife, formerly an elementary school principal, has been unable
to find any administrative work and is now a teacher. 129
The media viewed United States v. Lyons as a frightening example
of prosecutorial overreach. 130 This view, however, oversimplifies
the issues. Under the modern application of the Brady standard
to impeachment evidence, it is often almost impossible for
prosecutors to determine what their constitutional obligations
are. Moreover, the lack of any normal remedy for victims of Brady
violations, beyond a new trial, tacitly encourages prosecutors to err
on the side of withholding impeachment evidence. United States v.
Lyons stands as the exception to these trends. Perhaps it should
become the rule.

129 Id.
130 See generally Heath and McCoy, supra note 127.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/22

18

